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The dairy industry
MARKETING ORDER REGULATIONS
by BOyd M. Buxton
represents a major part of the ‘J.S. food systcm.
in 1977 consumer expenditures for fluid milk and manufactureci dairy prod-
ucts reached $27.4 billion and represented 12.6 percent of the consumers
I
total food dollar.
Questions are being raised about
marketing order program that directly
the impact of the federal milk
regulates the handling and farm--
level pricing of about 65 percent of all milk produced in the United
States. The program has been in existence for over 40 years and has
played an integral and pervasive part in shaping the U.S. dairy indus-
l/
try. — Before any
ant to untangle and
der to evaluate the
changes are made in the program, it would be import-
understand the complex economic relationships in or-
continued need for all or part of these regulations.
This paper is an example of post-legislative
evaluate a long-standing set of regulations.
Generally, the milk order program is not
research results have been very controversial
-1
researcl] designed to help
well understood. Some
9 and the points of view
vary widely. “ Some argue that the entire program does not meet the
stated goals outlined by Congress (Masson and Eisenstat) while others
argue that the goals have been achieved and the public interest served
with a minimum amount of government regulation (Forest). Some studies
have attempted to measure the social.costs of the program (Ippolito and
Masson, MacAvoy) or alternative pricing policy modifications of the
program (Buxton 1977; Dobson and Buxton). Other studies have considered2
the economic impact of alternative pricing policies under milk orders
(Hallberg; Fallert and Buxton).
This paper is divided into three parts. ‘rhe first part reviews the
major regulatory procedures and goals of the federal milk marketing or-
der program. It further develops the economic rationale on how the reg-
ulations achieve those goals and reviews the major benefits usually
ascribed to milk orders. The second part of the paper contains a dis-
cussion of the major economic impacts of milk orders while the third
part contains some conclusions
FEDERAL MILK MARKETING ORDERS
On January 1, 1979, there
and policy implications.
were 47 federal milk marketing orders in
the United States. These orders only regulate Grade A milk, which is
produced under more stringent sanitary conditions than Grade B milk.
Milk must be Grade A i.norder to be used as a fluiclbeverage (fluid
milk) while manufactured dairy products can be made from
or B milk.
There are two major regulations used in all federal
either Grade A
milk marketing
orders: (1) classified pricing whereby milk dealers (handlers) are re-
quired to pay different prices for the Grade A milk they buy, depending
on how they use the milk, and (2) pooling all revenue from the sale of
Grade A milk at the different use prices from which a uniform (blend)
price to be paid Grade A farmers is calculated.
Classif:gd Pric~
Federal order regulations require handlers who buy Grade A milk
from dairy farmers or associations of dairy farmers and who distribute
it in,the specified market area to pay at least minimum prices set under3
Lhe order for the milk according LO how the milk is usecl. If:Lhe milk is
used in fluid products such as whole milk, ski-mmilk, I.ow-fatmilk, :~nd
milk drinks, it is designated as Class I anclreceives a Class I price.
If the milk is used in manufactured dairy products such as butter,
dry milk, and nonfat dry milk, it is designated Class ~11 milk and re-
3/
ceives a Class 1’11price. --
The same Class III price i.sused in most federal orders and is set
equal to the average price that manufacturing plants pay per 100 pounds
of Grade B milk (f.o.b. plant) in the Minnesota-Wisconsin area (often
referred to as the M–W price). This price is determined by supply and
demand conditions in the manufacturing milk market and moves up and
down as supply and demand conditions in the market vary. A floor is
effectively placed under this price by the operation of tl]eprice suppOrL
program as the government stands ready to purchase dairy products in
4/
amounts needed to keep it from falling below the support price. -
A minimum Class I price is separately determined for each federal
order by adding a Class I differential to the M-W (Class 111) milk price.
Under present pricing policy, the minimum Class I price in federal or-
ders east of the Rocky Mountains can be approximated by adding to the
M-W price 90 cents plus 0.15 cents for each mile the specific order area
is located from Eau Claire, Wisconsin. For example, the minimum Class
I price in the Southeastern Florida market order is set at $3.15 above
the M-W price (9O cents plus 0.15 cents times the approximately 1,500
miles the order is from Eau Claire, Wisconsin).
Pooling Returns
A second major regulation of federal orders requires that al-lpay-4
ments for regulated Grade A milk in the different use classes be pooled.
A uniform (blend) price representing the average value of all Grade A
milk sales in the order is calculated and used as a basis for paying
dairy farmers or their cooperative associations. In order to qualify
for the pool, dairy farmers or their cooperative association must ship
designated proportions c)ftheir milk to the fluid market for Class I
use. The pooling regulation is a mechanism that allows all dairy farm-
ers producing Grade A milk in a given market to receive a comparable
price regardless of how their millc is used. Before federal orders were
established in 1937, milk cooperatives had instituted similar pricing
and pooling programs. However, the depression conditions made such
programs difficult to operate without formal government regulation.
Goals of Federal Milk Orders —
The major goals commonly ascribed to federal milk marketing orders
5/ as presently administered are reflected in the following list: —
1. to promote orderly marketing conditions for milk produced by
Grade A farmers
2. to set minimum prices consistent with supply and demand con-
ditions and to assure consumers an adequate supply of fluid
milk year-round
3. to administer and supervise the terms of trade in deficit milk
markets in such a manner as to equalize the market power of
buyers and sellers and promote constructive competition
4. to improve the income situation for Grade A dairy farmers5
An overriding objective is that milk orders are to be administered
so as to be in the public interest. Tl~eabove goals lack clariiy in
meaning by using terms such as “orderly marketing” and “adequate SUPPIY.”
These terms should be more precisely defined in order to better under-
stand what milk orders are to accornplisll.
The term “orderly marketing” i.susually associated with stabilizing
fluid milk prices, providing secure and dependable markets for individ–
ual Grade A dairy farmers producing milk primarily for the fluid market,
and promoting constructive competition by improving the balance 01 mar-
ket power between farmers and handlers. “Adequate supply” is usually
associated with maintaining a reserve of Grade A milk on a seasonal,
weekly, and daily basis that can be drawn from when the Grade A milk
supply is tight relative to fluid demand. Such a reserve would elimi-
nate unusually high prices and possible shortages.
The economic rationale on I]owthe classified pricing and pooling
regulations of milk orders serve to ach:ieve the goals of milk orders is
discussed in the following sections.
Stabilize Fluid Milk Prices. Classified pricing provides an eco-
nomic incentive for farmers in the aggregate to produce more Grade A
milk than is actually needed for fluid use plus an adequate reserve.
The impact of Class I differentials being consistently above cost-justi-
fied levels is to encourage Grade A dairy farmers sharing in these
higher-valued sales to increase their milk production and for some
Grade B dairy farmers to convert to Grade A milk production (Buxton
1978) . Higher fluid milk prices also discourage fluid milk consumption.6
The net result is a Grade A milk reserve that either can be used as fluid
when needed or diverted into manufacturing when not needed. This elimi-
nates the probable wide fluctuations in the fluid milk
the M-W price due to seasonal and other unsynchronized
supply of Grade A milk and fluid demand.
price relative to
variations in
This approach to stabilizing fluid millcprices works only if a
secondary market exists for the Grade A milk not needed to meet fluid
demand.
Market Security. Pooling the returns from the sale of all Grade.A
milk reduces the concern of farmers as to whether their specific milk
is used in fluid products at the higher Class 1 price or in manufactured
products at the lower Class 111 price. Farmers are paid on the basis of
a market average price regardless of how their specific milk is used.
Without. pooling, an individual farmer or his cooperative association
would be under economic pressure to sell as much of their own milk as




likely would develop as long as farmers could realize a
in that market. Some Grade A farmers probably would be
the Grade A milk market during the season of highest milk
production when Grade A milk supply exceeded fluid use. This would
leave the farmer seeking an alternative manufacturing market outlet for
the extremely perishable milk. Switching back and forth from the fluid
to manufacturing market may be difficult and at times results in dis-
tressed milk prices and even uncertainty as to whether an outlet exists.
The classified pricing and pooling regulations of milk orders,7
then, reduce the need for ‘tswitc!ling” outlets and provide Cr:ldt> A [I:liry
farmers with more secure markets.
Balancing Market Power. For a long time the dairy industry was — —.
characterized by many small dairy farmers selling milk to a relatively
few large handlers. Minimum Class I prices under milk orders protect
dairy farmers from the effects of possible price wars or other pric.e-
cutting activities by handlers. Such supervision of the terms of trade
is more likely to promote constructive competition for a commodity as
perishable as milk.
Increase Farm Income. Classified pricing tliatcharges a higher —
price for the relatively more inelastic demand for fluid milk is a form
of price discrimination. Returns to Grade A dairy farmers are incressed
by charging a higher price for milk used in the relatively inelastic
fluid market than in the manufacturing market.
To summarize, there is a logical rationale by which classified
pricing and pooling provisions of federal milk marketing orders can be
used to achieve “orderly” marketing and “adequate” supplies of milk and
to improve incomes of Grade A dairy farmers. Fluid milk prices have not
been more unstable relative to manufacturing milk prices,and fluid bev-
erage milk is available year-round in essentially every grocery store
across the United States. Also, Grade A dairy farmers are assured a
stable outlet for their milk even when large quantities of Grade A milk
are diverted into manufacturing. These aspects of milk marketing are
held by many as benefits of the federal milk marketing order program.8
Other benefits of milk orders incluclethe collection and dissemina-
tion of timely and accurate market information, unbiased audits, and
verification of weights and tests of farmers’ milk.
l’heinability to quantitatively measure some of the benefits com-
plicates any attempt to specifically measure public interest. It re-
quires that policymakers must consider the trade-offs and then make de-
cisions on selected provisions of federal milk orders and on the federal
milk order program itself.
Although the federal milk marketing order program has generally
achieved its goals, two relevant questions remain: (1) Can the same
benefits and goals be achieved at a lower social cost<! (2) Are there
alternative approaches to serving the needs of the f].uidmilk market?
To probe these questions in more detail, the next part of this paper
considers some basic economic implications of milk orders.
ECONOMIC 12@LICATIONS OF MILK ORDERS
Well-developed economic principles of milk marketing provide a
framework from which many of the economic implications of milk orders
are derived. Three particularly useful studies for analyzing the impli-
cations of milk orders were by .Bressler, Harris, and Kessel.
Seven major implications are identified in the following sections.
They are not mutually exclusive, nor are they all-encompassing, but
they are separately considered for discussion purposes.
Excess Reserves of Grade A Milk. Grade A milk production has in- .—.—
creased dramatically despite relatively small increases in the amount
of milk used as a fluid beverage. Grade A milk not used for fluid but9
diverted into manufacturing uses increased from about 24.3 billion pounds
in 1967 to over 42 billion pounds in .1977. This increase has come about
by both expanded milk production of existing CrarleA farmers as well as
some farmers converting from Grade B to Grade A milk production. The
conversion has been especially dramatic in Minnesota and Wisconsin where
a large proportion of the rerndning Grade B milk, is produced. In 1977,
66 percent of tlhcmilk produced in Wisconsin was Grade A, compared with
only 44 percent in 1967. In Minnesota, tileproportion of Grade A milk
increased from 19 percent in 1967 to 49 percent in 1977. All milk in
the United States will become eligible for fluid use if these trends
continue despite the fact that less than half of tl]emilk will likely
be used for fluid.
Why are farmers converting from Grade B to Grade A milk production
when essentially all the additional Grade A milk is diverted and used in
6/ the lower priced manufacturing market? — There are many contributing
factors, but one essential factor is a farmer being able to realize a
higher price for Grade A than for Grade B milk. ‘l A logical assumption
is that unless a farmer realizes or expects to realize a higher price
for Grade A than for Crade B milk, he would not be willing to incur the
added cost or inconvenience of the higher farm sanitary standards of
Grade A milk production. Because a dairy farmer must produce Grade A
milk to participate in a milk order pool, the blend price advantage over
the manufacturing milk price can provide tileeconomic incentive for a farmer
to conver~ from Grade B to Grade A production. This is how classified
pricing and pooling generate a reserve of Grade A milk and therefore10
contribute to orderly marketing. [f Class I price differentials in mi.1.k
orders can be set at levels to provide a necessary reserve, it would be
possible to set them at still higher levels, which would result in excess
reserves. An important implication of the rapid and likely nearly total.
conversion to Grade A mi.1.k is that Class 1.prices have been set hi~her
than can be justified for stabilizing fluid milk prices, providing mar-
ket security, providing adequate quantities of Grade A milk for the
fluid market, and otherwise achieving orderly marketing conditons.
Harris recognized this by pointing out that i.fclassified pricing were
used to achieve only market stability and security, that “there would
be no tendency toward expansion of supplies beyond the effective demand
requirement of the market” (Harris, pp. 66-67).
Geographical Price Distortions. Setting minimum Class I differ-
entials in order markets east of the Rocky Mountains according to how
far the market is located from Eau Claire, Wisconsin, ignores SUpply
and demand conditions for fluid milk in those markets. Why should the
Class I price in any market reflect transportation costs for fluid whole
milk from Eau Claire when that market has more than enough Grade A milk
plus a reserve to meet its own fluid demand and no milk is actually
transported? For example, in 1977 the New England milk market, where
essentially all milk is Grade A, utilized only 59 percent of its milk as
fluid while 41 percent was used for manufacturing. This is more reserve
than is needed to meet fluid demand by most standards and is evidenced
by the fact that no fluid milk is shipped from Eau Claire, Wisconsin,
into New England. Yeq in 1977 the average minimum Class I price was1.L
$11.46 in New England compared to $9.74 in the Chicago regional markc~
(USDA 1978, pp. 44 and 52). In the absence of regulation and assuming a
reasonable degree of competition, competitive forces would be expected
to cause the Class I price to fall in New England.
The present policy of using a single-price basing point in Eau Claire
ignores possible multi-basing points in other surplus areas such as New
England. The implication of geographically distorted prices is to en-
courage milk production in relatively inefficient production areas.
Preliminary research indicates that the distortion favors milk pro-
duction in the Northeast, South, and West relative to the Lake States,
Corn Belt, and Plains (Fallert and Buxton). Ilowever, additional research
is needed on evaluating the
implications of following a
exact magnitude of the distortion and the
policy to reduce this distortion.
Ew2.!Yw Milk production” Classified pricing and pooling creates
a divergence between the price a farmer receives for his milk and the
value of that milk in the marketplace. An additional amount of milk
produced will be worth the blend price to the farmer b{ltworth only the
Class 111 price in the market because it must be diverted into manufac–
turing. The divergence, giving inaccurate price signals to Grade A
dairy farmers, would be expected to result in the farmers producing
more milk individually and in the aggregate than would be if they re-
ceived the market value rather than the calculated blend price.
The average price received for fluid eligible milk in 1!378was
$10.79 per hundredweight while about 40 percent of that milk was sold
at the manufacturing milk price of $9.68 (USDA 1979, p. 28).12
Depressed Manufacturing Milk Market. Increasing Class 1 different-
ials encourages milk production, as described above. It also discourages
fluid milk consumption by increasing fluid milk prices. The com’bined
impact i.sto increase the amount of milk tha~ must be used to make addi-
tional manufactured products to be sold in the manufactured dairy prod-
uct market. These additional manufactured dairy products tend to depress
the manufacturing milk market. The actual impact on the manufacturing
millc price (Class 111 price) depends on whether the market price is at
or above the manufacturing milk support price. If the market price is
the same as the support price, the government will. purchase, under ~he
price support program, the added dairy products resulting from the
higher Class I differentials. If the market price is above the manu-
facturing support price, then the added dairy products would depress
manufacturing milk prices. In both cases, classified pricing and pool-
ing provisions under federal milk orders tend to keep the manufacturing
milk market depressed.
Benefits only Grade A Farmers. Only Grade A dairy farmers receive
higher’milk prices as a result of classified pricing and pooling under
milk orders. Because relatively high Class I differentials under milk
orders tend to depress the manufacturing milk market, Grade B farmers
are worse off,or at best no better of~ as a result of them. It is true,
however, that many Grade B farmers, by converting to Grade A milk pro-
duction, can also benefit. However, this is a forced situation because
the only alternatives to converting to Grade A milk are to accept the
Class 111 price for their milk or quit dairy farming altogether.13
Because milk markets do not benefit Grade B farmers, pursuing the
goal.of classified pricing to increase the income of Grade A farmers
raises a major equity question: Can classified pricing legitima~ely be
used to improve farm income when all farmers do not benefit?
Inefficient Movement of Milk. Once a cooperative that is princi-
pally manufacturing dairy products in plants located relatively close toa
fluid market ships enough milk to qualify for the pool, the incentive to
ship additional Grade A milk to the fl.uicl market is greatly diminished.
If it does ship additional milk to the fluj.dmarket, it could not pay
its producers any more for their milk. There is an actual disadvantage
in shipping milk to the fluid market since the cooperatives that have
manufacturing facilities would want the largest volume of milk possible
to lower unit costs in its own manufacturing operation. Negotiated
Class I prices above federal order minimums help provide the incentive
for such cooperatives to “give up” the milk in their own manufacturing
operation and ship it to the fluid market. This means that increased
Class I differentials may still not get the milk needed for fluid use.
This would result in the need to go further distances from the
central market to obtain enough milk for fluid demand even though closer
supplies existed. To the extent this phenomenon exists, fluid handlers
would need to bring milk for fluid use from more distant areas than
likely would be the case without regulation. Many factors influence
the manner in which cooperatives serve the fluid market; only general
forces and implications are pointed out here.
Restrictions on Reconstituted llilk. The present order programJ. 4
assumes that fluid milk demand must be met with fresh whole milk, As
discussed, a reserve of Grade A milk would be needed under this assump-
tion to balance seasonal and day-to-day variations in supply and demand
and thereby stabilize prices.
However, it has been technically possible for some time to commer-
ci.al.ly recombine nonfat dry milk, nl.ilkfat, and water into a fluid bever-
age milk. This reconstituted product could then be blendeclwith fresh
whole milk to meet fluid demand. 10 effect, this would provide a stor-
able reserve rather than a fresh fluid milk reserve. Presently, there
are provisions in fecleralmilk marketing orders that effectively raise
the cost of reconstituted milk so as to make it an uneconomic alterna-
tive. II
A recent report has taken a preliminary look at the effects of re-
constitution on regional prices, utilization, and production (Hammond,
Buxton, and Thraen). Results indicate that the maximum Class I diff-
erential would be less than the actual Class I differentials that now
prevail under federal and state marketing orders. Generally, the Class
I differentials based on fluid transportation costs from Eau Claire,
Wisconsin, could no longer hold.
Another implication of this alternative would be that Class I diffe-
rentials high enough to create a necessary fluid reserve could no long–
er be justified on the basis of stabilizing fluid milk prices. The
storable reserve could achieve the same orderly marketing objectives as
previously attributed to the fresh fluid reserve.
More research is needed on the potential of other possible alter-15
natives. For example, about 2 pounds of nonfat dry milk and 21.3 pounds
of water may be blended with 100 pounds of fresh whole milk of 3.7 per-
cent fat to yield 123.3 pounds of fluid milk with 3 percent fat. The
average fat test of all fluid beverage milk is now 3 percent fat. Also ,
frozen concentrated milk, like frozen concentrated orange juice, would
reduce transportation costs, increase shelf life, and may open new mar-
kets for fluid milk domestically and overseas.
A major implication of the present milk order regulations is that
they distort the economic feasibility of possible innovations in serving
the fluid milk market more efficiently without sacrificing orderliness
or adequate supply objectives.
This raises an interesting question: What kind of fluid milk in-
dustry would evolve if the only economic use of milk was as a fluid
beverage? Clearly a reserve, much of which would need to be dumped,
would be costly. A great deal of innovation would be expected to avoid
waste. Storing fluid milk as nonfat dry and milkfat ingredients or in
other forms to be recombined probably would be an integral part of such
a dairy industry.
CONCLUSIONS
Economic principles of milk marketing and current research metho--
dology contribute a great deal to evaluating the impactof milk marketing
order regulations. However, it does not answer all the questions.
There is presently no methodology that could predict with a high degree
of confidence what the real world would look like without the federal
milk marketing order program. The competitive model may not accurately16
reflect the conduct of cooperatives and handlers. Would or could coop-
eratives step in and impose the same result as acl]ieved under market.
order regulations? Are some regulations needed to create a heajtlly com-
petitive environment?
At the present time, no model or methodology exists that can pre-
dict whether disorderly and chaotic conditions would definitely appear
in the absence of regulation. Could the technological changes in hand-
ling and transporting milk and the ability to store fluid milk in ingred-
ient form result in orderly marketing of milk without the present regu-
lations? Even if the answer were yes, would such a change in policy be
in the public interest by increasing social.welfare? Which groups
would benefit and which would lose? What kinds of resource adjustments
would be required? These questions require additional research even
though considerable work has been done. The research must be a broadly
focused, no-holds-barred approach. There is a tendency for a “conven-
tional wisdom” to appear in connection with long-established regulations
on why things cannot be done differently.
The economics of milk marketing and research methodology are suffi-
ciently well–developed to identify some of the major economic impacts
of milk marketing regulations. A major conclusion is that the goal of
increasing returns to Grade A dairy farmers has been explicitly or im-
plicitly pursued beyond that needed to stabilize fluid milk prices and
provide market security. Reducing Class I differentials from the pres-
ent levels would, therefore, be possible without risking the market
stability, security, or adequate supply objectives. The decrease would17
need to be made over time in small incremental amounts since present
research methodology is not able to identify the exact cost--justified
Class I differentials in all federal order markets with a lligl~ level of
confidence.
Although the relevance of welfare theory is still a matter of de-
bate, it represents the best methodology available for evaluating whether
lowering Class I differentials would be in the public interest. y~ The
results of the previously mentioned studies indicate that lower Class I
differentials would increase social welfare while raising Class I diff-
erentials would do the opposite. This would be the conclusions as long
as the Class I differentials were not lowered below the level needed to
provide a necessary reserve and thereby to stabilize fluid milk prices.
Another significant conclusion based on the economics of milk mar-
keting is that a geographical distortion exists in the Class 1 price.
This distortion results from implicitly assuming only one surplus fluid
milk area from which Class I prices in all other markets are aligned
according to distance. This ignores supply and demand conditions in
various regions of the United States. In additton, welfare theory
seems adequate to conclude that reducing the distortion is in the
public interest. However, the impact will be quite different among
regions. The adjustments imposed on dairy farmers in the regions
where price would be most affected (Southeast) would be considerable.
Perhaps compensating those most affected would reduce the impact while
still moving toward a more efficient system.
A real limitation in analyzing milk orders is a lack of good18
estimates on how dairy farmers in selected regions and consumers would
respond to significant price changes. Better supply and demand estimates
are needed. If obtained, they would, in combination with conventional
economic theory, provide a great deal of useful analysis for policy de-
cisions regarding milk marketing regulations.19
FOOTNOTES
&/ The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, as amended,
provides the legal basis for the federal milk marketing order program
(Ward).
2/ For example, see the exchange of ideas between tl]eU.S. JusLice —
Department and the U.S. Department of Agriculture resulting from the
original report entitled “The U.S. Justice Department Report oJ.1 Milk
Marketing.”
~/ Milk used in certain soft manufactured products is designated
Class 11 and receives a Class 11 price about 10 cents above the Class
111 price. Conceptually, these two use cLass designations can be
treated as one.
~/ The government presently supports the U.S. manufacturing milk
price, which is normally about 10 cents below the M-W price but moves
up and down with it.
~/ Sections 601, 602, and 698c(18) of the Agricultural Agreement
Act of 1937, as amended (USDA 1971), contain the specific st.,;~>ments on
the objectives of the orders as stated by Congress. Also, a 1976 report
to the Secretary of Agriculture by the Federal Milk Order Study Commit-
tee (USDA 1962, pp. 12-13) outlined the Committee’s views on what were
the major objectives of milk orders. See also Ward.
6/ At present, there appears to be no public health concern over —
the consumption of manufactured dairy products made from Grade B rather
than Grade A milk. Therefore, converting from Grade B to Grade A milk20
is not nor has it been explicitly stated as a goal of classified pricing,
7/ The economic relationship between classified pricing and c’xcess —
Grade A milk is explained in Buxton 1978.
~/ Seven states have outright prohibitions on the production and/
or sale of reconstituted milk while 9 states have Grade A standards that
effectively prohibit the sale or manufacture of reconstituted products
(Hammond, Buxton, and Thraen, pp. 18-19).
9_/ After review of welfare theory, Currie et al. concluded that i.t
was the most useful tool available for many kinds of policy questions
despite some limitations (Currie).21
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